CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 31 July 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mrs. A. MYRDAL (Sweden)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
	Mr. P. CABRAL de MELLO
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U CHIT MYAING
	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. P.A. LAPOINTE
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. J. STRUCKA
	Mr. J. CINGROS
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN
Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA
Japan:	Mr. K. ASAKAI
	Mr. Y. NAKAYAMA
	Mr. M. OGISO
	Mr. T. SENGOKU
Mexico	Mr. J. CASTANEDA

Mongolia:	Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
	Mr. J. BANZAR
	Mr. Z. ERENDOO
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. C.O. HOLLIST
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Poland:	Mr. A. CZARKOWSKI
	Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZIO
Romania:	Mr. N. ECOBESCO
	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
	Mr. A. SASU
Sweden:	Mrs. A. MYRDAL
	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. S. ERICSON
	Mr. J. LUNDIN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
	Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV
	Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. E.S. El REEDY
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. F. MULLEY
	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. R.C. HOPE-JONES

United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R. McCORMACK
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the 424th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): The epoch-making exploits of the astronauts on the moon, to which the whole world rightly pays homage, place in sharper relief than ever the meagreness of the achievements on earth in responding to the anxieties expressed the world over about the continuing nuclear arms race. One year ago we all welcomed the agreement on a nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) which represented a major step in the direction of effective arms control; but as yet even this accomplishment has not reached fruition. I should like to take this opportunity to associate myself with the call issued at our meeting of 29 July by my colleague the representative of Czechoslovakia (ENDC/PV.423, paras. 25, 26) to all countries to sign and ratify the non-proliferation Treaty in order to bring it into force without delay.

3. I know, of course, that the objective of all the members of the Committee is to strive towards generally-acceptable agreements on the matters on our agenda. It seems clear that in order to achieve success we have in the first instance to seek common purposes on each issue before trying to agree on language. With that end in view the Canadian delegation presented certain suggestions at our last session relative to two items on the agenda, the comprehensive test ban and the sea-bed. At this resumed session I made certain suggestions on chemical and biological warfare informally yesterday which I should like to repeat more briefly for the record today.

4. First of all on the question of seismic exchanges. On 23 May I submitted a working paper on seismic exchanges (ENDC/251) in the hope that it would be possible to find at least some minimal area of common purpose in the field of seismic international co-operation, without projudice to any other positions which might be held regarding the vital question of ending all nuclear-weapon tests. I hope that during this session it will be possible to achieve some progress regarding the projected request for information on seismic co-operation which our proposal envisages.

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5. We are particularly mindful that the General Assembly at its last session assigned the highest priority to the question of the comprehensive test ban; and for that reason I hope that our report to the next session of the General Assembly on the question of seismic co-operation may reflect some indication of progress on the vexing question of verification of such a test ban. I am sure that it will not have escaped the notice of my colleagues that we are now at the end of July and that shortly we will be required to face once again the critical examination of our work by the General Assembly.

6. I have therefore proposed that we should call an informal meeting on 13 August on the comprehensive test ban. At that meeting I hope that in particular -- without prejudice to any other suggestions that may be made to the Committee -- we shall examine further our proposal for seismic exchanges and try to arrive at a common purpose to enlarge and improve seismic exchanges as a necessary step which should be taken in all events, whatever positions respective Governments might hold on the question of verification. We would hope also that an agreed formula would be included in the report of this Committee to the next session of the General Assembly.

7. On chemical and biological warfare I think that our informal discussions yesterday reflected both the certain areas of possible agreement and the difficulties in finding common ground which have yet to be surmounted. We seem to have as a common purpose a desire to ensure that what is done by this Conference now in regard to chemical and biological warfare should in no way derogate from the obligations most of us assumed in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575, p. 117) or undermine in any way the validity of that document in prohibiting the use of those weapons. We also seem to be in agreement on the need to undertake further steps building on that sound foundation.

8. But, proceeding from this point, it would seem that any course of action would, of necessity, be directed primarily at the problems of development, production and stockpiling of those weapons. It is precisely because of that that we welcome the British initiative in our search for supplementary measures which will strengthen existing agreements and preclude the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. While it is not my intention to pursue today a detailed examination of the British draft text (ENDC/255), we do believe that, given the provisions of its article V, it does not prejudice progress towards the elimination of chemical warfare while

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addressing itself in the first instance to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. Perhaps I should state that we put forward this view in the light of the great importance that the Canadian Government attaches to progress in the elimination of chemical warfare.

9. There do, however, seem to be some limitations on the progress we can make here in the immediate future, and I think those limitations were clear enough from our discussion yesterday. They relate above all to the question of whether or not, in trying to agree on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons, an agreement can be first sought on one type of weapon without dealing simultaneously with the other type.

10. We have, however, the responsibility to provide some constructive comments and guidance for the United Nations General Assembly on the course that our future discussions on the elimination of these terrible weapons will take. We have, of course, as a basis for discussion the extremely useful and important report of the Secretary-General (A/7575), and it was to that report that the Polish delegation addressed itself in its working paper of 22 July (ENDC/256).

11. Taking those several elements into account, and particularly recalling the question of the timetable to which Mr. Mulley drew attention in our informal discussion yesterday, we wonder whether the Committee might not seek to reach agreement on the following common purposes and give guidance to the next session of the General Assembly along the lines which I suggested yesterday and which I now summarize for the record:

Re-affirm General Assembly resolution 2162(b) (XXI) of 5 December 1966 (ENDC/185), which calls for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and invites all States to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol;

Welcome the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare and express appreciation to the consultant experts who were the co-authors;

Commend the report to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for its further consideration of the question of chemical and biological weapons;

Commend also the United Kingdom draft convention on biological methods of warfare (ENDC/255) and request the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to complete its work on it at an early date; and -

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Request a report of progress on all aspects of the problem of chemical and biological weapons, to be presented to the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

12. I should like now to turn to the question of the sea-bed. At the meeting of the Committee on 13 May (ENDC/PV.410) I also offered some preliminary suggestions on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof (ENDC/240) which had been put forward for the consideration of the Committee by the Soviet Union on 18 May. Here again, if the objective of all members of the Committee is to reach some general agreement there must in the first instance be an effort by all of us to seek and define our common purposes on this issue; and with that end in view the Canadian delegation contributed an analysis of what we consider to be the essential constituent factors of a possible agreement: namely the scope of possible prohibitions, their geographic limits and their verification.

13. In making our suggestions we addressed ourselves to the substance of the problem in an effort to clarify the factors involved. Rather than try in the first instance to put our thoughts into unequivocal treaty language, we thought that an initial analysis of substance was desirable in seeking possible common ground among members of the Committee. Subsequent comments from others have indicated interest in, or sympathy with, a number of the suggestions we advanced; and I am therefore encouraged to believe that some of the thoughts of the Canadian delegation might still offer possibilities in developing more generally acceptable international arms-control arrangements relating to the sea-bed.

14. Moreover, my remarks at the 410th meeting were directed in large part to the Soviet draft and particularly to the problems it raised for countries such as Canada. Since that time other delegations have offered preliminary views of their Governments, and the United States delegation has done more in submitting a further draft for a sea-bed treaty (ENDC/249) on 22 May, together with a further explanatory statement at our meeting of 22 July (ENDC/PV.421), which offers an alternative to some of the basic concepts of the earlier Soviet draft.

15. I am sure we all noted with satisfaction the opening statements of our co-Chairmen at this resumed session indicating the priority they both assign to these sea-bed negotiations. While we continue to believe that progress must be recorded as well on

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the other issues I mentioned, particularly those more directly related to the fulfillment by the nuclear Powers of their obligations under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, we also believe that it is essential to report to the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly that substantial progress has been made in the negotiation of a treaty covering arms control on the sea-bed. We think it is now possible to define further the issues involved and to delineate basis for agreement on them. It is important, if not vital, that during this session the Committee should arrive at accommodations which could be supported by every member, in order that our report to the next session of the General Assembly may contain generally-acceptable recommendations on this important subject.

16. The proposals which I put forward in my statement of 13 May have in the interim been the subject of consultation between my Government and other interested Governments. The distinctive features of the Canadian suggestions have been given further consideration, and I should like today to offer some elaboration of them and some explanation of the reasons behind our proposals. But I should like to stress at the outset that we agree with the United States that the prohibition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction from the largest possible area of the sea-bed should be given the highest priority, and we would consider an agreement which accomplished this objective as a major step in the direction of effective arms control.

17. We do hope, however, that we can achieve more, and thus we should not wish to stop there. We wish to ensure that careful and serious consideration be given by all parties to the various alternatives in order to achieve a treaty which provides the most effective possible assurances for the security of signatory States and a system of verification which takes into account the interests of the majority of potential signatories. In this connexion we are giving careful study to the proposals outlined by the representative of Sweden and put forward by you, Madam Chairman, at our meeting on 24 July (ENDC/PV.422, paras. 39 et seq.) as possible bases for compromise positions acceptable to all members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament as well as to the other valuable suggestions made by other delegations. I now propose to discuss the major elements of the Canadian suggestions.

18. First as to prohibitions. In May we attempted to suggest in analytical form the types of weapons which we believed should be considered for prohibition, starting with nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction together with their associated containers, platforms and structures. In considering the problem of demilitarization

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realistically we thought it necessary also, in view of probable early developments in undersea science and technology, to consider other weapons which may also be developed and which, if affixed to the sea-bed or ocean floor, would inevitably extend the arms race to this environment just as surely as, even though less destructively than, nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. To put it differently, non-nuclear States require protection first and foremost against nuclear weapons but also against non-nuclear weapons which might be implanted or emplaced on the sea-bed. Inclusion of such weapons in the prohibitions of the treaty would also play a useful role in having an agreed understanding about research and development activities in this field now, rather than waiting to take action until we face a specific threat. It would also ensure that such weapons would be subject to agreed verification procedures.

19. We believe that consideration should therefore be given to developing treaty language which would prohibit those weapons which could be used against the territory, the territorial sea or air space, or objects therein, of another State without, however, prohibiting installations required for self-defence. We appreciate the point made by you, Madam Chairman, on behalf of the Swedish delegation (ibid., para.41), that in our preliminary statement the Canadian attempt to define specific prohibitions may have been unnecessarily complex. We believe nevertheless that it should be possible to develop treaty terminology which would be based on a concept of specific prohibitions and which would prohibit weapons most likely to result in an expansion of the arms race. Failure to curb development of such weapons -- as you, Madam Chairman, pointed out -- would be a serious omission. With this in mind we should like to suggest that consideration be given to the principle that States would undertake not to implant or emplace on, within or beneath the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond an agreed coastal band: (a) any nuclear weapons; (b) any weapons of mass destruction; (c) any storage containers, launching platforms or structures related to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction; (d) any other weapons, under-sea bases, or fortifications, with which or from which military action could be undertaken against the territory, territorial sea or air space (or objects therein) of another State.

20. We believe that such a definition of the scope of the treaty advanced by Canada is in keeping with the Committee's ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament, while providing for the essential security interests of a coastal State and particularly the security needs of non-nuclear States and States with long coastlines difficult to defend. On the one hand, prohibitions limited to nuclear weapons and

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weapons of mass destruction would not, in our opinion, deal adequately with the security threat arising from the possibility of the emplacement of other offensive weapons and installations on the sea-bed. Indeed, these limited prohibitions would give to the emplacement of conventional weapons a respectability or legal sanction they might not otherwise enjoy, and would also lead to possible conflicts respecting the right to protect the emplacements in question. On the other hand, the blanket prohibition on the sea-bed and ocean floor of all weapons and military activities, as proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is obviously deficient in protecting security and other interests of coastal States. It would preclude the emplacement of surveillance devices capable of detecting the approach to the shores of ships or submarines which, under international law, enjoy freedom of navigation, and would also preclude other defence measures deemed necessary.

21. In sum, therefore, the Canadian view is that further consideration needs to be given in both draft treaties before us to the essential purpose of satisfying each State's legitimate security interests, while contributing to disarmament and arms-control measures which are the objectives of this Committee.

22. I should now like to say something about the geographic area to be covered by the prohibitions in the treaty. We have stressed in all relevant discussions that the largest possible area of the sea-bed should be subjected to arms-control measures. In both drafts before the Committee this view appears to be generally accepted. The basic Canadian approach has been that the sea-bed should be reserved for peaceful purposes, consistent both with the United Nations Charter and with other principles of internationa law. Among the principles of the Charter which we believe to be applicable to the sea-bed, as to other agreements, is the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence under article 51. In this connexion we must recognize that only weapons emplaced or fixed on the sea-bed and ocean floor are under discussion and that we are not dealing with the prohibition of submarines or other vessels, which in accordance with the tradition of freedom of the seas would continue to have access to the approaches of coastal States. In addition to the right of self-defence and the principle of the freedom of the high seas, we have in mind the exclusive sovereign rights of coastal States, under the 1958 Geneva Convention,[1/] to explore and exploit the continental shelf.

1/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol.499, pp.311 et seq.

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23. Now as to the security zone. In the light of these considerations we have advanced the concept of a 200-mile security zone extending from the outer limits of the twelve-mile coastal band in which the coastal State would enjoy preferential defence rights, it being clearly understood that all the prohibitions agreed to under the sea-bed treaty now under consideration would apply within this zone. No State, not even the coastal State, would be allowed to emplace in this zone weapons prohibited by the treaty. Within this security zone, however, the coastal State, or any other State acting with the explicit consent of the coastal State, would be able to perform those defensive activities not prohibited under the treaty, while other States would have no such rights. We believe that a provision along these lines should be considered for the purpose of satisfying the legitimate defence requirements of coastal States under the Charter. This concept clearly recognizes that the security interests of a coastal State would be jeopardized if other States, without its permission, were to install military devices on the sea-bed in the waters adjacent to the coastal State. In this connexion, the representative of Brazil outlined in very clear terms at our last meeting the relationship of a coastal State's verification interests to a possible security zone (ENDC/PV.423, paras.75 et seq.).

24. These considerations would appear particularly important if the prohibition eventually agreed to were restricted to nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. In that event, if provision were not made for a coastal State security zone along the lines of the Canadian proposal, foreign States would be permitted to install even offensive conventional weapons on a relatively permanent basis immediately beyond the limits of the defined narrow coastal band. We consider that few States with big coastal interests would be willing to accept the presence of such installations.

25. As to the coastal band, the two draft treaties before us differ with respect to the width of the defensive coastal band. Canada would prefer a broader rather than a narrower band, in part because it corresponds with what appears to be an international trend towards a twelve-mile territorial sea, but in part also because we believe that national security interests would be best served by the wider band. We listened with considerable interest also to the important proposal by the representative of Japan that consideration be given to discarding completely the concept of a defensive coastal band (ENDC/PV.420, paras.14, 15). Inclusion in the treaty of a more limited

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coastal band or the elimination of the band altogether would make even more important, we believe, a wide security zone such as we have described, which would permit the coastal State to exercise more effective control over its adjacent waters. It should be noted also that the Japanese proposal raises difficult questions with regard to verification (ibid., paras.16 et seq.), to which other representatives have made reference.

26. The representative of Sweden also has made an interesting proposal with respect to a two-tier coastal band (ENDC/PV.422, para.52). The Canadian authorities are now studying this suggestion, which provides somewhat the same protection for the legitimate interests of coastal States as the proposal for a single twelve-mile coastal band. We appreciate that this suggestion was intended to provide a compromise as between those States which favour a three-mile coastal band and those which favour instead a twelve-mile coastal band by using in a more restricted way the principle underlying our concept of a 200-mile State security zone. We wonder, however, whether States with a twelve-mile territorial sea would in fact be willing to accept such restrictions upon their sovereignty in the outer nine-mile region of their territorial sea. We wonder also whether they would be willing to allow the carrying out of observation and inspection procedures in this region of their territorial sea.

27. Lastly, I should like to refer to the verification problem. The two draft treaties before us differ also in their general approach to the problem of the verification of the prohibitions they would include. You, Madam Chairman, on behalf of the Swedish delegation put forward some proposals regarding a verification system which is designed to complement the remainder of the Swedish concept with respect to prohibitions and the geographic zone (ibid., paras.54 et seq.). Without commenting at the moment on the specifics of the Swedish proposal, I might state that we welcome the obvious underlying concern with ensuring that all signatories would be able to participate in the verification procedure. I have already expressed in my statement in May (ENDC/PV.410, para.10) concern at the restrictive approach contained in the Soviet draft; but the verification article in the United States draft also seems restrictive in that its proposal concerning the right to observe and in suspicious circumstances to consult and co-operate will not ensure freedom from fear in countries with less developed undersea technologies which may suspect that they may be threatened by weapons or military installations in an adjacent area of the sea-bed.

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28. We wonder whether those countries with less well developed undersea technologies might count on the co-operation and assistance of those with more highly developed technologies in the detection and inspection of prohibited installations, particularly in areas of the sea adjacent to the coastal State. We believe, for instance, that it would be in the interests of all of us if a verification procedure could be devised offering the maximum assurance possible, within admittedly the known technical limitations, to which the representative of the United States referred the other day (ENDC/PV.421, paras.47 et seq.), that all signatories have the right to request not only the verification of activities or installations that may give them concern, but also that it be coupled with an undertaking that the nations which have a more developed competence in underwater technology would co-operate as well as consult.

29. Such a verification procedure might take many forms, but we would suggest that careful thought be given to various factors for possible inclusion. For example, a verification proposal taking the above considerations into account might include the following features. All installations and structures on the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond the twelve-mile coastal band would be open to observation and inspection by representatives of the other States parties to the treaty. States wishing to carry out actual inspection of installations and structures would be required to give prior notice of their intention to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Every party would have the right to apply to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the co-operation and assistance of other States in carrying out the verification process. On receipt of such an application the Secretary-General would make arrangements for the verification measures to be carried out by a technically competent State party to the treaty. The applying State would be able to nominate an official to accompany the technicians of the investigating State.

30. As for the financing, we have given some thought to a proposal which would require the complaining State to accept the financial responsibility for a verification operation in which no violation of the treaty was discovered, since this would serve to ensure that requests for verification were limited to instances in which serious concern and international action were warranted. We thought that in order to ensure that the provision was not discriminatory it might be appropriate that, in the event that the verification procedures provided evidence of a treaty violation, the cost of the investigation would then be paid by the offending State or through an agreed procedure set up by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If inspection were taking place within the 200-mile security zone, the coastal State involved would be

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consulted and allowed to nominate officials to accompany the investigating technicians, whether that State had introduced the complaint or not. Each State party to the treaty would undertake to agree to full co-operation in the verification process.

31. In our view the verification problem must be considered from the point of view not just of the present degree of sea-bed exploitation or present competence in this environment, but rather of that which may prevail during the life of any treaty. Many delegations recently attended briefings, kindly arranged by the United States delegation, which pointed up the fact that a large number of peaceful sea-bed installations and structures will probably be under construction if not in actual existence in the not too distant future. It is probable, for example, that underwater drilling rigs and perhaps even extensive undersea engineering structures are within the realm of possibility as a result of the world-wide search for new sources of power. Such developments would make it extremely difficult to verify a generalized prohibition such as that proposed by the Soviet Union.

32. The size and nature of future sea-bed engineering will also make it extremely difficult to detect violations of the prohibitions which the United States has proposed covering nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction only. These weapons might be concealed in other engineering forms and only close physical inspection would offer any assurance of verification. A system involving close physical inspection could be extended without undue difficulty to the list of prohibitions proposed by Canada.

33. Finally, a word about the terms of the treaty. The concept of a review conference as outlined in the United States draft treaty (article V) might, we believe, be retained whatever terms were agreed on in the final treaty. Our concern, however, has been that any treaty should be comprehensive enough in its prohibitions to serve as a long-term agreement. While a review conference might consider all aspects of the treaty, it should probably concentrate its attention mainly on verification techniques.

34. I realize that the proposals which I have been outlining differ in several respects from both of the draft treaties now before the Committee. While our primary purpose in advancing our proposals was to ensure that the interests of countries such as Canada were taken into account, we believe also that some of

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the suggestions in our modified position might help in the search by this Committee for a compromise. It is essential, in our opinion, that such a compromise be reached before the end of this present session so as to avoid a situation wherein we go to the General Assembly with two drafts without being able to report any reconciliation of views as a result of negotiations in this Committee. If such a situation were to develop, the purpose of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to act as a negotiating instrument on disarmament matters would be severely criticized. It is our hope, therefore, that the Canadian position will be given consideration by the other members represented here in formulating an agreed recommendation which might go forward from this Committee.

35. Mr. ASAKAI (Japan): I asked for the floor today to speak on the question of the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests. Six years have already passed since the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was concluded in 1963. As we recall, the parties to the Treaty proclaimed in its preamble their intention to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and their determination to continue negotiations to that end. A number of valuable proposals and suggestions have since been made in this Committee seeking the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests conducted underground, the one environment left untouched in the partial test-ban Treaty. Our special tribute in this regard goes to the delegation of Sweden for its incessant efforts. Unfortunately, however, it has not been possible so far to conclude a treaty on this subject.

36. The prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests is the most effective means of halting the qualitative "improvement" of nuclear weapons. For this reason it is the earnest desire of the Government and people of Japan, who strongly hope for nuclear disarmament, that a treaty to prohibit all underground nuclear-weapon tests will be concluded at the earliest possible date. Now that the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) has been agreed upon, we in this Committee must renew our determination to exert our utmost efforts to attain this goal.

37. In dealing with this subject we have to consider its dual aspects -- political and technical. The political aspect is, of course, the question of political decisions, which are in the last analysis in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union. The technical aspect is how best we can develop a means of adequate

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verification which can ensure the observance of the treaty. Today I should like to address myself specifically to this technical question.

38. The verification of compliance with the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests is certainly not an easy problem. Unlike test explosions in the atmosphere, underground explosions can be neither sighted from the air nor detected by means of collecting radioactive debris in the air. The only possibility is to detect and identify them by recording underground disturbances caused by them. Hence arduous efforts have been made to elaborate seismological means of detecting and identifying such explosions.

39. Particularly in the past few years, marked improvements have been made in the seismological means of detection and identification. No doubt technical developments, including the establishment of array stations, have made their contribution to such improvements. But more important has been the further development of international co-operation, which is traditional in the field of seismology. There was, for example, the meeting of the "detection club" convened in May 1966 on the initiative of the Government of Sweden with the participation of representatives of eight Governments, including the Government of Japan.

40. Another important event was the discussion in the study group on seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions which met in April and June of last year upon the initiative of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), with the participation of leading seismologists of the world, including those from the four nuclear-weapon States (ENDC/230). It was agreed in the study group that at a magnitude of 4.75 and above it was almost 100 per cent possible to identify underground explosions using the relationship between surface waves and body waves recorded at teleseismic distances. I should like to remind the Committee that a magnitude of 4.75 was considered by the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958 only as a future target for seismological identification of explosions. Indeed, the SIPRI study group opened a new era in the negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests.

41. However, we have to admit that there is a limitation to the possibility of detecting and identifying underground explosions by seismological means. Opinions differed among the members of the SIPRI study group on whether it was possible to distinguish explosions from earthquakes as the level of magnitude went down from 4.75

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to 4.5. As the figure goes further down the magnitude scale, identification by teleseismic observation becomes more difficult, and at the present stage it is not easy even to detect at long range underground events of magnitude 4.0 and less. It is impossible at present, and will remain so in the foreseeable future, to detect events of magnitude 3.0 and less at teleseismic distances.

42. Those facts lead us to the inevitable conclusion that, so long as one takes the position that an underground test-ban treaty should not be concluded unless all underground explosions, however, small, are to be detected and identified, there will be no chance for a complete underground test-ban treaty in the foreseeable future. In order to conclude a treaty prohibiting all underground nuclear-weapon tests one has to start from the premise that a political decision has to be made to prohibit all such tests when a means is devised to detect and identify underground explosions above a certain limit in size.

43. Intrinsically, the size of such explosions should be expressed in terms of the power of the explosions or "yield". But yield of explosions is not observable from outside. Inasmuch as we employ the seismological means of verification, magnitude is the only physical quantity observable to us. Thus the limit that I referred to earlier should also be expressed in terms of magnitude. What, then, should be the level of that magnitude? The easiest answer is to set it at magnitude 4.75, as explosions above that level of magnitude can be identified even at present. It may be asked, however, whether it is appropriate to leave out explosions of magnitudes below 4.75. For example, the size of explosions of magnitude 4.0 is reported to be 2 kilotons in granite and 6 kilotons in tuff, and to reach the level of 25 kilotons if fired in partly-saturated alluvium. Difficulties may exist in concluding a complete underground test-ban treaty without further assurances that test explosions of this order of magnitude would be identified.

44. Detection of explosions above magnitude 4.0 will become possible in the near future through improvement of the existing networks of teleseismic observatories; but identification is another matter. As it is the relationship between body waves and surface waves that is used for identification of explosions, and as it is not possible at present to record surface waves of explosions below magnitude 4.5 at teleseismic

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distances, it becomes necessary to employ data recorded at local or regional distances in order to identify explosions of magnitudes between 4.5 and 4.0, a figure which may be used for the moment as the limit in question.

45. Taking all those factors into consideration, my delegation wishes to make a suggestion for a workable formula to reach our ultimate goal -- the prohibition of all underground nuclear-weapon tests.

46. The first step in that formula would be to agree to prohibit underground nuclear-weapon tests above magnitude 4.75 while securing a commitment by all States to co-operate with each other with a view to devising within a certain period of time a system of verification which would be able to monitor all underground explosions above magnitude 4.0. This first step is a provisional measure, taking fully into account the fact that the divergence of views among States on the necessity of on-site inspection prevents us from realizing the prohibition of all underground nuclear-weapon tests at a single stroke. It is our hope that the suggestion I have just put forward will be accepted by all States without delay.

47. The second step would be to agree on a complete underground test-ban when the foregoing system of verification was completed. Let me further elaborate the specific measures which should be taken to implement the system of verification suggested in our formula.

48. First, as our suggestion is based on the measurement of magnitude, a system to determine the magnitude of each underground disturbance should be established. One of the problems pointed out by the SIPRI study group was the difference in magnitude reported on the same event by eastern and western observatories, which is probably due to the difference in period characteristics of the respective instruments. It would be necessary to ensure that the magnitude reported on an event would be the same regardless of who the reporter might be, so that there would be no room for dispute about the basic scale of measurement. One effective step might be an agreement to designate a certain number of observatories for each subject area and to determine the magnitudes of events on the basis of data reported by them. We might also request in this respect co-operation from the Magnitude Committee of the International Association of Seismology and Physics of the Earth's Interior.

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49. Secondly, the purpose of verification under our formula would not be attained effectively unless seismological stations in the world were properly distributed. Our next step, therefore, should be to examine the existing networks of seismological observatories in the light of the need to make the local or regional observation required to identify explosions above the limit explained earlier. In that connexion the Japanese delegation wishes to support the suggestion made by the representative of Canada on 17 April on the registration of observatories (ENDC/PV.404, para. 89). If there are important areas which are not covered by the existing stations, the States concerned need to agree to improve the existing observatories as well as to establish new ones as is found necessary.

50. A question may arise at this point on the number of new observatories to be installed. The number may differ considerably depending upon several factors. For example, there is the question of where the "important areas" to be covered are, and how wide they should be. There is also the fact that explosions of the same size detonated in a similar medium may produce considerably different magnitudes according to different circumstances. They may well produce magnitudes higher than expected. For the purpose, therefore, of restraining explosions which are normally expected to produce magnitudes above a certain level it may suffice to install enough observatories to identify explosions of a magnitude somewhat above that level. It is assumed that the number of necessary observatories would decrease as the magnitude level of explosions to be identified became higher. My delegation wishes to suggest that a meeting of experts be convened to examine further all the relevant aspects of this matter.

51. Thirdly, all the States should agree to make all seismic data available internationally. Data to be made available should include

(1) Data on all underground events except local micro-earthquakes, which are to be reported on a daily basis by telegraphic means;

(2) Copies of graphic and magnetic records on specific underground events which are to be supplied upon request; and

(3) Some analytical data on these specific events.

More specifically, the data to be provided on a daily basis to which I have referred in (1) above should include the arrival time of the first motion of body waves and the maximum amplitude and the period of that wave group, the arrival time of the depth phase,

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and the maximum amplitude and the period of surface waves. I should like to add that such daily data are already exchanged internationally to some extent for academic purposes.

52. In order to ensure the credibility of the data supplied, it might be necessary to agree in addition to provide seismographic records for the period when there was no earthquake, the calibration record of seismographs, and other materials to show the state of maintenance and operation of the stations, including observation diaries. In this connexion the experimental explosions which the United States plans to detonate in September and afterwards will contribute to the process of improving the identification capabilities through international exchange of seismological data. My Government is therefore prepared to co-operate fully with that operation.

53. Now, given the situation where necessary seismological data are regularly made available by the observatories properly distributed all over the world, our next step should be to establish an international centre which will process all these data promptly, and regularly report the location of epicentre, depth, body-wave magnitude and surface-wave magnitude of all underground disturbances reported by the co-operating stations. There are already international centres which conduct such an operation on a global or semi-global scale in Edinburgh, Moscow, Strasburg and Washington, D.C. Their services are put to practical use by UNESCO, for example, for its counter-measure activities against earthquakes. They are, however, not quite adequate for our purpose in either the speed of data collection and processing, the quantity and quality of reporting, or the geographic distribution of contributing seismological stations. We must examine this matter further, and seek to organize one effective international centre for quick reporting on seismic events. Such a centre will be an important cornerstone of the seismological means of verification and must be operated as an international institution. In this regard the suggestions made in the Committee on 17 April by the representatives of Canada (ENDC/404, paras. 82 et seq.) and the United Kingdom (ibid., paras. 12 et seq.) deserve our very careful study.

54. I now come to the question: What if a request to provide data on a specific event should be rejected, or if falsified data should be provided on it? My delegation wishes to suggest, in order to prevent such an unfortunate situation the setting up of what

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may be called an international monitoring centre which would objectively analyse seismological data and determine whether there were underground nuclear explosions. Whenever there was a suspicious underground event, the centre would request, on the basis of the data-exchange agreement which I have described earlier, the provision of copies of graphic and magnetic records as well as the result of their analysis, not only of such an event itself, but also of other events which should be compared with it. This centre might also be authorized to request, if necessary, the provision of certain other materials which might confirm the credibility of the data provided.

55. Further elaborating the functions of the centre, these would be (1) to examine regularly the report of the quick reporting centre on the epicentre, depth and magnitude of underground events and to point out suspicious events; (2) to collect necessary data on the suspicious events and other events to be examined for analytical purposes; (3) to analyse the collected data and determine whether the suspicious events were underground explosions or earthquakes; and (4) to watch regularly the operation of the registered observatories. In view of these functions, the centre might best be staffed by scientific and technical experts on an international basis.

56. This is the suggestion of my delegation on a seismological means of verification of compliance with a complete underground test-ban treaty on the basis of international co-operation. As all the specific measures indicated in my presentation involve technical problems in the field of seismology, I hope that they will be examined by the experts in this field without delay and that we can come to an early agreement on the complete prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. In further elaborating and implementing these specific measures, Japan will contribute as much as it can through providing the knowledge and experience it has accumulated in the field of seismology as well as through other means. My delegation will welcome any comment on the suggestions I have made today.

57. Mr. ECOBESCO (Romania) (translation from French): Speaking for the first time during the current session of the Disarmament Conference, the Romanian delegation would like to convey its sincere congratulations to the delegations of the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan, and to express its satisfaction at seeing them amongst us, joining in the efforts that we must all exert in order to negotiate and adopt effective measures in disarmament. We are convinced that the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic, a socialist country with which Romania is linked by close relations of friendship and co-operation, will make a valuable contribution to the activities of this Committee, as it does in the United Nations and in other international bodies. We are also convinced that the delegation of Japan, a country whose interest in disarmament problems is well known, will participate actively and effectively in our negotiations. In wishing complete success to the delegations of the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan in the missions which have been assigned to them by their Governments, we express our conviction that good relations of co-operation, calculated to serve all the activities of the Committee, will be established and developed between our delegations.

58. The profound changes taking place in the contemporary world, the impetuous development of the forces of production, the massive penetration of science and technology into all spheres of human activity, the intensification of the international division of labour -- all this determines objectively the need for peaceful co-existence amongst States having different social systems and different political philosophies. At the same time, peaceful co-existence as a fundamental postulate is indispensable, since it is the only alternative to a devastating thermonuclear conflict.

59. Hence there is an imperative need to expand, multiply and diversify the co-operative ties between all the countries of the world, to intensify relations and contacts in order to find the most appropriate ways and means of solving the

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multitude of problems which confront mankind today, and to do so in keeping with the national interests of all States. Certainly it would be useful and desirable if the objective trends towards the development of international co-operation were reflected as fully as possible in the policy and actions of governments, and became reasons of State destined to govern to an ever-increasing extent the relations between countries and peoples.

60. International co-operation does not take place in a legal vacuum. It rests on the great principles of contemporary international law -- namely national sovereignty and independence, equality of rights and mutual advantage, non-interference in internal affairs and the peaceful solution of disputes, excluding recourse to force. These principles must govern absolutely all relations between States, for only on this basis will it be possible to establish full and complete mutual confidence and good-neighbourly relations between the peoples. The strict observance of the fundamental norms of law and justice appears to be an indispensable condition for ensuring the assertion of the personality of each nation, its independent development according to its own will, without outside pressures or interference; because, to paraphrase the well-known adage, where the force and authority of the principles and norms of law cease, there can be neither freedom nor assurance for anyone.

61. The imperative of peaceful co-existence demands that persevering efforts be made to ensure peace on earth; to put all mankind's knowledge at the service of the betterment and happiness of man and not of his annihilation; to use the conquests of science and of modern technology for the well-being of mankind, the fulfilment of the noble aspirations of man towards progress and a better life.

62. And it is the accomplishment of disarmament that would help to the greatest extent to attain that noble objective.

63. Starting from the premise that disarmament is an instrumental process at the service of a clearly-defined aim -- international peace and security -- Romania has militated and militates unceasingly in favour of general disarmament, a sure means of banishing for ever the danger of war from the life of society. We place at the centre of the preoccupations and actions which the world community of nations must

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undertake without delay the achievement of concrete measures leading to nuclear disarmament — the only radical means capable of averting the danger of an atomic conflagration. The conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*) undoubtedly represents a step in this direction, but it is only a beginning. Like the delegations of many other countries, the delegation of Romania considers it absolutely necessary that that Treaty be followed by effective measures of nuclear disarmament, such as the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the complete cessation of tests of such weapons, the limitation and reduction of strategic vehicles, the cessation of production and the liquidation of stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

64. The stipulations of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty, the resolutions of the General Assembly, and the agenda (ENDC/236, p.3) adopted in this Committee a year ago establish quite clearly the absolute priority to be given to measures of nuclear disarmament within the framework of our negotiations. Despite that, we are still far from having made even the slightest progress towards the central objectives of the mandate entrusted to us.

65. If we wish to achieve tangible results with a view to the accomplishment of our main tasks, we must avoid being diverted from the right path. Side by side with the consideration of preventive measures, the efforts of the Committee must be constantly directed towards the negotiation of agreements aimed at the gradual destruction and eventual complete elimination of thermonuclear means of warfare. To attain that end it is necessary to go beyond the stage of declarations and embark upon the path of practical achievements. The complexity of the problems, the numerous obstacles which must be surmounted, are frequently referred to. That is a reality. But can that reality outweigh the crushing reality of the arms race with its heavy economic consequences and the great dangers it entails for the security and even the life of the peoples?

66. We must not forget that, unless we undertake in time measures to stop the armaments spiral, it will take on ever more dangerous proportions and will become, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, said recently, one of the

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gravest problems, the problem of the seventies. That is precisely why we consider that now, when the United Nations is concerned with the adoption of a global strategy for peace and progress for the eighth decade, it is necessary to draw up a concrete programme of action also in disarmament negotiations.

67. In our time, the era of a world of interdependencies, international peace and security are indivisible. Universal security constitutes, in the last analysis, the sum total of the regional systems of collective security. This being so, actions directed towards the strengthening of general security, including those in the disarmament sphere, must be combined with effective measures for the consolidation of security at the regional level.

68. The Socialist Republic of Romania, as a European country which has felt the full impact of the horrors of two world wars, is vitally interested in the creation of a climate of peace and co-operation in Europe, in the realization of European security. The Romanian people sees in the durable solution of this problem a basic condition for the untrammelled development of its task of peaceful construction for the benefit of its progress and prosperity. At the same time, we start from the premise that the realization of European security would be in keeping not only with the aspirations and interests of the peoples of Europe but also with the general cause of peace.

69. Security on the European continent must be conceived in such a manner as to offer to each people full and complete assurance of its territorial integrity, its rights and its legitimate interests. That being the objective, the important problems of Europe must be settled through peaceful ways and means on the basis of the universally-valid principles and methods contained in the United Nations Charter, the observance and strict application of which are incumbent upon all and in respect of all.

70. According to the profound conviction of the Romanian Government, at present there are many favourable opportunities for successfully carrying out actions aimed at safeguarding security on the European continent. Obviously this is an objective that could not be attained merely through general declarations or the

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expression of good intentions. As an urgent and continuing task, the building of European security demands sustained, concrete efforts by all countries, an active policy of development of contacts between States, and the persevering and patient exploration of all possibilities leading to its accomplishment. Mr. Nicolae Ceausescu, President of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania, declared recently:

> "Acting in the spirit of peaceful co-existence, Romania deploys intensive activity in the development of relations of co-operation in the economic, political, cultural, technical and scientific spheres with all States irrespective of their social or political systems. This is the end to which the numerous exchanges of visits, political diplomatic contacts and talks between the representatives of our country and those of many other countries of Europe and other continents are devoted. Within the framework of these contacts and meetings, both problems of bilateral and common interest and matters affecting contemporary international life are tackled, which enables us to have useful exchanges of views, to understand our positions better, and to co-operate in a spirit of friendship and mutual confidence for the cause of peace and security."

71. In this connexion the greatest importance attaches to the liquidation of military blocs, the elimination of military bases on the territory of other States, the withdrawal of foreign troops within their own national frontiers, the creation of denuclearized zones, and at the same time the avoidance of any act which might poison the climate of international politics.

72. The convening of a conference of European countries, as proposed in the recent Budapest appeal (ENDC/243) issued by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, would make possible a broad collective discussion of the problems to which the organization of security on the continent gives rise, would facilitate the search for solutions of difficulties obstructing relaxation of tension, and would favour a positive development of the international climate in Europe.

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73. As my country has done hitherto, it intends to continue together with other States to make the fullest possible contribution to the cause of the relaxation of tension and of peace and security in Europe, including the preparation and holding of the European conference in the best possible conditions.

74. The reply addressed by the Romanian Government on 11 July last to the Government of Finland concerning its memorandum relating to the convening of a conference on European security states inter alia:

> "The Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania is prepared to examine with all due attention suggestions by other European States concerning the organization of the conference and to discuss obstacles that might arise in the way of the realization of this idea; and it is open-minded in regard to any proposal designed to bring about security and co-operation on the continent. In its opinion it is essential that a constructive attitude be adopted towards this matter, that the European States meet with each other, and that they show the maximum open-mindedness towards initiative and points of view favourable to peace and the relaxation of tension, whatever their source. At the same time it is necessary to initiate new actions calculated to rally ever larger forces to the effort for the multilateral development of co-operation between the European States, irrespective of their social systems."

75. Permit me now to express the views of the Romanian delegation on three of the questions on the agenda of the Conference.

76. One of our most urgent tasks, imposed expressly by resolution 2455 (XXIII) of the General Assembly of the United Nations (ENDC/237), is the elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests. As is well known, it is under this same resolution that our Committee must report on this question to the next session of the General Assembly.

77. The position of the Socialist Republic of Romania in regard to this question has been and continues to be crystal clear. We have maintained and continue to maintain the need to prohibit such tests, being convinced that such a measure would help substantially towards curbing the nuclear arms race, particularly as regards its qualitative development. No one in this Committee has spoken against the conclusion of such an agreement. On the contrary, in highlighting the harmful consequences of such tests all the representatives have spoken in favour of their rapid cessation.

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The positive effects of a treaty on the prohibition of underground tests, both at the level of the disarmament negotiations and in terms of specific steps to be undertaken towards nuclear disarmament, have been underlined by all of us. Despite this, and notwithstanding the repeated requests by the United Nations that we reach an agreement, the practical progress achieved is negligible. The treaty that it is our duty to draw up does not appear to loom on the horizon.

78. Much has been said of the difficulties connected with control. We are all agreed that there are in fact certain difficulties. But our task is to make unrelenting efforts to find appropriate solutions to the difficulties that arise, and not to make of them an obstacle which paralyses the progress of the negotiations. This is all the more so since abundant information is at the disposal of the Committee testifying to the possibility of solving the question of verification effectively by having recourse to the means that recent scientific and technical conquests have made available to us.

79. During the first part of this session the Committee considered in detail the possibilities of detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions, especially through the utilization of the methods and techniques available to modern seismology. It is to the credit of the Swedish delegation that, after carefully studying in detail the scientific and technical data and means, it has put before the Conference a working paper (ENDC/242) containing concrete suggestions with regard to the contents of a treaty on the cessation of underground nuclear-weapon tests. Interesting and useful elements have been submitted to our Conference by other delegations also, and more particularly by the Canadian delegation (ENDC/248). This, by casting a powerful light on the technical aspects, has helped us better to understand the problems and their implications.

80. The debates of the preceding session -- and this seems to us to be their most salient feature -- converge towards an essential conclusion: from the technical point of view the controversal question of control can be solved. In those circumstances, what are the obstacles standing in the way of an agreement? The reply to that question, to our mind, lies in the political field. The solution of the problem of the urgent cessation of underground nuclear-weapon tests depends -- and this has been stressed repeatedly in this Committee -- on the political will of States, and first and foremost the political will of the nuclear Powers, to reach agreement.

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81. In the opinion of the Romanian delegation our Committee must redouble its efforts at this session also to give greater impetus to the negotiations on this subject. The discontinuity of the debates and the lessening of the attention given to so important a problem could only lead to the postponement of a solution so long awaited by the United Nations and called for by world public opinion. Assuming that it will not be possible to submit concrete proposals to the General Assembly, we feel that the report should contain substantive comments on the development of the discussions, the positions upheld by the various delegations and the stage which the negotiations have reached.

82. Among the areas likely to open up vast prospects for fruitful international co-operation, that of the sea-bed and the ocean floor has a special place. Brought to the attention of the United Nations almost two years ago by the Government of Malta, the question of reserving exclusively for peaceful purposes the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, aroused general interest. The explanation is to be found in the fact that those territories and their subsoil contain immense wealth, to the exploitation of which mankind will very probably be compelled to resort in order to ensure the continuity of progress in a world which calls for rapid development and whose resources are not unlimited.

83. According to the recommendations of the General Assembly, the exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction should be carried out for purely peaceful purposes in the interests of the whole of mankind, taking into account the special needs of the developing countries. The concept of the utilization of that area exclusively for peaceful purposes is, in the view of the Romanian delegation, the condition sine qua non for fruitful international co-operation in this field. Such co-operation, as is stressed in General Assembly resolution 2340 (XXII)

> "... should be conducted in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and for the benefit of all mankind".

Those are demands which compel all States to refrain from projecting unilateral interests into that area or from transforming it into a field of military competition.

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84. Basing itself on the considerations I have briefly outlined, the Romanian delegation declares itself firmly in favour of the adoption of energetic measures designed to prevent the militarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. From that point of view we consider that the draft treaty submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union (ENDC/240), which proposes the prohibition of all military activities, offers the most comprehensive and effective solution.

85. It appears from the debates that have taken place hitherto that the question of verification is the cause of general concern. The Romanian delegation expresses itself in favour of the establishment of an effective international system of control which would be carried out through an appropriate body designed to serve exclusively the purpose of verifying fulfilment of the obligations assumed under the treaty. It goes without saying that all States expressing the desire to do so must have the opportunity of participating in such control machinery. It is also necessary for the system of control established by the treaty to take into account the interests of all States, large and small, without any discrimination whatsoever: in other words, the provisions concerning control must give expression to the actual equality of the States participating in the future agreement.

86. The concept of an international system of verification is shared by many delegations. The representative of India, Ambassador Husain, for instance, stated on 17 April last:

> "The issue of verification for a sea-bed treaty would have to be dealt with in the light of the principle of international means of verification, so that all parties could feel assured that the prohibitions of the treaty were being complied with. The right of verification would need to be available to all parties and denied to none." (ENDC/PV.404, para.70).

87. We noted with particular attention also the view expressed on 22 July by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Ambassador Khallaf, when he said:

> "A system of verification and inspection, in order to be both workable and attractive, should ... take into due consideration the manifold interests of the large part of the community of nations. In this light it becomes of the utmost importance that such a system should be tailored in such a way as to afford every country, even a small country, an opportunity to put it into operation whenever it deems it necessary. The right to inspect should therefore

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acquire, as far as possible, practical value for all. Without that a non-armament agreement on the sea-bed would fall short of enlisting the wide adherence which is an essential factor if it is to be meaningful." (ENDC/PV.421, para.114).

88. The two draft treaties now before the Conference, the Soviet draft treaty -- to which we have already referred -- and that submitted by the United States delegation (ENDC/249) contain considerable differences regarding the main elements of the agreement we are called upon to elaborate: the nature of the prohibition, its field of application and the methods of verification. The solutions we arrive at must represent the reflection of the willing agreement of the member States and the political, economic and security interests of all countries. The final regulation must ensure the exploration, exploitation and utilization for purely peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. At the same time it must respect the sovereign rights of States over the continental shelf and over the natural riches to be found in the area contained within the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as the international norms in force governing the régime of the high seas.

89. The question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is approached by our delegation in the light of Romania's position of principle, according to which all weapons of mass destruction, without any exception, must be outlawed and banned from the military arsenals of States. That represents an objective of great significance and topicality for the general cause of peace and international security, for the achievement of general disarmament. The constancy with which Romania has militated in the past in favour of the prohibition and abolition of means of mass destruction will not cease to guide the efforts which we intend to exert, in conjunction with other States, with a view to adopting concrete measures in this field.

90. The disastrous consequences of a possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons are described in detail in the excellent report which has been presented to us by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/7575). We should like to take this opportunity to express our congratulations to the Secretary-General, to the consultant experts and to all those who have contributed to the preparation of this valuable document, which constitutes a sound basis for discussion and ought to guide our negotiations in this matter. We should like to emphasize some of the essential features of the Secretary-General's report.

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91. The first relates to the over-all method of approach to the problem confronting us. In keeping with tradition, and bearing in mind the elements that are common to chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents, the report gives an eloquent demonstration of the need to prohibit and abolish these two categories of weapons.

92. The second feature brings into relief the very special importance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (ibid., p.117) on the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases and of bacteriological methods. As one of the first countries to sign that important instrument of international law, Romania declares itself in favour of the reinforcement of the Protocol along the lines indicated by resolution 2162 B (XXI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which appeals for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol, condemns all actions contrary to those objectives, and invites all States to accede to it (ENDC/185). That is precisely why the proposal of the Secretary-General to repeat the appeal addressed to all States to accede to that Protocol has our full and complete support.

93. A third feature, to which the Romanian delegation attaches very special significance, is that the measures aimed at liquidating stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons are conceived in a universal manner. The first virtue of any international agreement is the equal treatment of all the parties. Deriving from the fundamental postulate of the equality of rights of States, it excludes by definition any discriminatory relation. That is the meaning that we give to the proposal of the Secretary-General concerning the non-proliferation -- both vertical and horizontal -- of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, which is couched in the following terms:

> "To call upon all countries to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons." (A/7575, p.xii).

94. Those are the reasons why the Romanian delegation declares itself in favour of the suggestion in the working paper of Poland (ENDC/256) according to which the Committee should underline, in its report to the General Assembly, the importance of the document

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submitted by the Secretary-General and recommend that it be considered in the light of the proposals made by U Thant.

95. As to the draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare (ENDC/255) submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom, we appreciate that it represents the expression of a desire to contribute to the solution of the question of eliminating those means of warfare from the arsenals of States. However, we note that, contrary to the over-all approach advocated by the General Assembly and by the report of the Secretary-General, the United Kingdom document deals with this problem separately from that of chemical weapons. The question is whether it will be possible by proceeding in that manner to attain the objective of abolishing both chemical weapons and bacteriological (biological) weapons. In other words, our discussions will have to elucidate the implications of the method on which the United Kingdom draft is based, and to do so in all respects. After carefully studying the draft, the Romanian delegation will be in a position to give its views in greater detail on this subject.

96. Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia): Before I go into the substance of my statement, permit me to avail myself of this opportunity to express our gratitude to those representatives who have addressed kind words of welcome to our delegation and have assured it of their co-operation. My delegation would like to repeat here that it will do all in its modest capacity to live up to the wishes and hopes expressed by the various representatives.

97. In my first statement on 3 July I stated briefly the policies of my Government on some major ingredient questions of the disarmament problem (ENDC/PV.416, paras.11 et seq.). Today I should like to address myself to the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use (A/7575), and to present in broader terms my delegation's views concerning the vital questions dealing with the elimination of these weapons of mass destruction.

98. First of all, I should like to express to the Secretary-General and his consultants our deep appreciation of the comprehensive and highly expert study that they have produced in a relatively short space of time. As we all know, the report covers, from

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the technical and scientific points of view, all the different aspects of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons -- that is, their basic characteristics, potential toxicity, speed of action, duration of effects, the unpredictable danger that their use in war might bring to mankind, and so on. In this respect it represents, as a number of speakers have already stated, a good basis for profitable discussions in this Committee and for the elaboration of sound measures with a view to effectively eliminating these weapons of mass murder.

99. My delegation is especially appreciative of the following conclusions of the experts: first, that chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare clearly belongs to one and the same class of weapons of mass destruction; second, that in recent years there has been both horizontal and vertical spreading of these weapons, which are fraught with the danger of unlimited proliferation; third, that no system of defence could be completely secure; fourth, that because of this fact the universal elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons would not detract from any nation's security; and fifth, that the earliest effective elimination of these weapons would correspond to the best interests of the human race (A/7575, paras.371-377).

100. We note further with great satisfaction that one of the major merits of the Secretary-General's report lies in the recognition of the significance of the Geneva Protocol (ibid., p.117) concerning the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare as an important international legal instrument, and in the confirmation of the urgent need for ensuring universal observance of the principles and objectives of the Protocol.

101. My delegation considers that the recommendations of the Secretary-General concerning the further action to be taken to deal with the threat posed by the existence of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (ibid., p.xii) logically ensue from the afore-mentioned conclusions, and we subscribe fully to the urgent appeal of the Secretary-General.

102. My delegation has studied carefully the statements of other representatives on the report of the Secretary-General and also the relevant documents which have been submitted to the Committee. By way of commenting on some of them I shall try to expound my delegation's position on certain aspects of the question I have chosen to speak on today.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

103. I shall refer first to the working paper (ENDC/256) tabled by the delegation of the Polish People's Republic, to which my delegation wishes to give its wholehearted support. Having presented this important document, the Polish delegation, which has initiated important ideas in the field of tackling the problem of chemical and bacteriological warfare, suggests the right course of an immediate and positive response by the Committee to the report of the Secretary-General and the conclusions contained therein. My delegation associates itself with the opinion expressed in the working paper that the guiding principles for the further work of the Committee in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should be, first, the strengthening of the Geneva Protocol, and second, joint consideration of the two kinds of these weapons.

104. Mongolia, which is a party to the Geneva Protocol, believes like many other Governments that whatever measures this Committee envisages initiating should be in full conformity with General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI) (ENDC/185); in other words, they should only strengthen the Protocol. We firmly believe that this Protocol has been and remains a very important international instrument which prohibits the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and not only has stood the test of time but has also played a significant restraining role against the use of those weapons by the German Nazis during the Second World War. Ambassador Husain of India stated:

> "My delegation believes in the continuing importance and validity of the Protocol, regardless of the passage of time or of the phraseology used, or of the absence of a system of international control -- which in this case it would be extremely difficult to provide anyhow." (ENDC/PV.404, para.73)

I think that the feelings of many of us in this Committee could be summed up in that way.

105. To emphasize the urgent need for strengthening the Geneva Protocol our delegation, for its part, would like to make some small suggestions. It might be appropriate for this Committee, in its report, to recommend that the General Assembly should appeal urgently to all governments which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Protocol in the course of 1970, which is the year of the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of that historic document and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. An appeal might be issued also to the parties to the Protocol reminding them of their obligations under it, as follows: "The High Contracting Parties will exert

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol." We think that this suggestion might evoke a lively response on the part of the Members of the United Nations which, in connexion with the commemoration of the important date in the life of the Organization, are taking fresh initiatives designed to ensure the implementation of the principles and aims of the Charter and to promote the safeguarding of universal peace and security.

106. Now let me make some observations concerning the draft of a convention on the prohibition of biological weapons submitted by the United Kingdom delegation on 10 July (ENDC/255). I appreciate the interest shown by the United Kingdom delegation in this important problem. My delegation also duly notes that the authors have reflected in that draft convention a desire to reinforce the Geneva Protocol and a stipulation to prohibit the production and stockpiling of biological weapons. I was impressed yesterday by Mr. Mulley's eloquent arguments in support of the draft convention and his earnest belief in the significance of concluding at this juncture a convention on the prohibition of biological weapons alone. However, this could not alleviate certain misgivings of my delegation concerning the appropriateness of the separate treatment of chemical and bacteriological weapons suggested in the draft convention. As many previous speakers have already pointed out, these types of weapons have always been treated jointly in all pertinent treaties and agreements, and more specifically in the Geneva Protocol and in recent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. Furthermore, we think that many representatives in their statements have most eloquently -- and indeed beyond any doubt -- proved the inseparable association of the two kinds of weapons from the scientific, legal and practical points of view.

107. Some time ago Mr. Roshchin, in addition to his own most convincing arguments, cited (ENDC/PV.421, para.75) a well-founded statement from the Secretary-General's report (A/7575, para.19) expounding the closely-allied nature of chemical and bacteriological weapons. I am not going to tax the patience of the Committee by quoting that passage again. I want only to emphasize that, whenever we speak of the close alliance of chemical and bacteriological weapons, we have in our minds primarily the somewhat organic or genetic interrelations between them.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

108. In this connexion I should like to point out that the experts, by giving in their report the comparison of the physical characteristics of chemical and bacteriological weapons, had no intention whatsoever of favouring separate treatment of these weapons. Any assertion contrary to this understanding would, I am afraid, constitute at the least a wilful interpretation of the views of the experts.

109. The fact that in the armed forces of many countries questions concerning chemical and bacteriological means of warfare and protection from them are dealt with by the same services is one of the practical reflections of the close relationship between the two kinds of weapons. Moreover, it is appropriate to mention here that chemical and bacteriological weapons as those of mass destruction are considered jointly in the respective drafts of a treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) and the United States (ENDC/30 and add.1-3).

110. Thus the treatment of biological weapons separately from chemical weapons runs counter to international usage based on sound theoretical concepts and practical experience. My delegation fears that such a way of tackling the problem of these weapons of mass destruction would have a number of serious negative consequences, regardless of the intention of its proponents. I want to make it clear here that I am far from judging the intentions of the authors of the draft in question. I am speaking here only of the possible implications that the division of the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons into two parts might have in the future.

111. The first adverse consequence might be the weakening of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We think, as do many others around this table, that the conclusion of a separate agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons without a simultaneous banning of chemical weapons might lead indirectly to the infraction of the Geneva Protocol as an instrument outlawing the use in war of all chemical and bacteriological agents.

112. We further think that separate consideration might hamper or even block progress and prolong the road to our ultimate goal of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We have an apprehension that shelving the question of the prohibition of chemical warfare until a later stage of negotiations might in fact give the green light for its horizontal as well as vertical proliferation. Thus we might find ourselves playing into the hands of those who are interested in the production,

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

perfection and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The fact that at present a number of countries are actively engaged in the research and testing of still more sophisticated chemical weapons, as well as the latest Press reports about the alarming incidents with lethal nerve gases, cannot but further deepen our concern.

113. For the aforesaid reasons my delegation is in favour of tackling the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons as one single question in conformity with its nature. In keeping with its principled stand, the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic has always come out for the effective implementation of general and complete disarmament and has lent its full support to the measures promoting the achievement of this end. In the same spirit the Mongolian delegation expresses again its readiness to support any proposal aimed at the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons of mass destruction.

114. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): The co-Chairmen have asked me, as Chairman of the day, to read the following joint statement from them which was conveyed to members of the Committee yesterday, 30 July:

"In accordance with their statement of 23 May the co-Chairmen have continued their consultations regarding enlargement of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It was agreed at that time that the enlargement of the Committee could not be confined to two countries and that various other regions of the world should be represented. The co-Chairmen wish to express their appreciation for the patience and understanding of members of the Committee while the co-Chairmen have continued their difficult consultations.

"The objective of the co-Chairmen has been to reach agreement on a group of countries which, together with Japan and the Mongolian People's Republic, would give the enlargement geographic and political balance and at the same time preserve the Committee as a small and effective negotiating body.

"The co-Chairmen wish to announce that their Governments have now been able to reach agreement on the following additional countries: Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. The co-Chairmen believe that it would be appropriate for those countries to be invited to participate in the work of the Committee. The co-Chairmen have in mind that

(The Chairman, Sweden)

the report of the Committee to the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly would, of course, reflect the above developments and thus the action taken to enlarge the Committee would be conveyed to the Assembly.

The co-Chairmen would like to suggest that, following the plenary meeting on Thursday, 31 July, the Committee meet in informal session to provide members an opportunity to consult further on this matter. If any members would like to place their views on record, the Committee would return to formal session for that purpose.

115. I shall now suspend this formal meeting in order that the Committee may hold an informal meeting without a verbatim record.

The meeting was suspended at 12.45 p.m. and resumed at 12.55 p.m.

116. The CHAIRMAN: The first part of our formal meeting ended with my reading out the communication from the co-Chairmen, in connexion with which I now call on the representative of Mexico.

117. Mr. CASTANEDA (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): The position of the Government of Mexico in regard to the enlargement of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has been and continues to be that which was explained by my delegation at the meeting on 3 July (ENDC/PV.416, paras.44, 45). Furthermore, we consider that the fact of the adoption on one occasion of a procedure that seems to us inappropriate and incorrect, in order to bring about the entry of new members into the Committee, is not a sufficient reason to justify, nor to induce us to accept, the use of the same procedure on another occasion.

118. Alhaji SULE KOLO (Nigeria): My delegation takes note of the statement by the co-Chairmen about their intention to enlarge the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament by including the following additional countries: Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. My delegation wishes to make it quite clear that the Nigerian Government has no objection to any of these countries participating in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We should like, however, to put on record the fact that the list was drawn up without prior consultations with us and that we have our doubts as to whether the objective of preserving a geographical and political balance, as mentioned in the co-Chairmen's statement, has been maintained.

(Alhaji Sule Kolo, Nigeria)

119. We wish to draw attention to the imbalance in the geographical representation, particularly as far as concerns Africa, and more particularly Africa south of the Sahara -- that is, East, Central and West Africa. We also share the views of some of our colleagues here who believe that such an important decision should receive the blessing of the United Nations General Assembly before its implementation.

120. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): I should like to state very briefly the position of the United Kingdom delegation on this very difficult question. We have always taken the view that questions of membership of this Committee are primarily the responsibility of our two co-Chairmen, having regard to the origins of the Committee and its practice since it was set up; and we have so informed those who have discussed this problem with us. We shall warmly welcome our six new colleagues, as we welcomed the representatives of Japan and Mongolia at the beginning of this session, and believe they will all make a contribution to our work.

121. There are of course a number of other countries which might be considered as candidates and which would also make a useful contribution to our work. On the other hand, the growth in the size of the Committee reduces its effectiveness as a working and negotiating body -- to which we attach great importance. This is the basic dilemma posed by the issue of enlargement. In the light of this consideration, and taking into account the other essential criterion of preserving the geographical and political balance of the Committee, we regard the decision of the co-Chairmen as a satisfactory outcome of this extremely difficult issue.

122. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): The Canadian Government has, since the discussion began on the enlargement of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, recognized the need to make the Committee a more representative forum for disarmament negotiations. With this end in view we believe that enlargement should be limited and balanced with particular emphasis on countries which could play a useful and effective role in negotiations on disarmament.

123. The additional six countries now proposed by the co-Chairmen apparently have been chosen with those criteria in mind, and we particularly welcome the Netherlands, a country with which Canada has very close ties and which we believe will make an outstanding contribution to the work of this Committee. But we would hope that the countries admitted in this enlargement will agree to exert their considerable influence

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

in their own regional groups in the United Nations General Assembly in order to safeguard this Committee as the important disarmament negotiation forum which it should be -- particularly through the limitation of numbers.

124. With regard to the General Assembly itself, we would hope that the report from this Committee would be so carefully drafted that the General Assembly's acquiescence should not be too readily assumed in the light of the controversial aspects of the authority vested in the co-Chairmen in this matter; and I find myself in sympathy with some of the misgivings expressed by colleagues on this point.

125. In conclusion, permit me to express the hope that the co-Chairmen will find as much success in agreeing upon some measures of disarmament as they have found on the enlargement of this Committee.

126. Mr. FRAZAO (Brazil): In my statement at the informal meeting on 23 May, during which the co-Chairmen informed the Committee of the agreement they had reached on the admission of Japan and Mongolia, I expressed the view of my delegation on the necessity to preserve a balanced geographical and political distribution whenever we should come to any decision to enlarge the membership of this Conference. It is with satisfaction that I acknowledge that these considerations have been taken into account by the co-Chairmen during the consultations that have led to the proposal now submitted to the Committee. The countries listed represent indeed different political interests, and the list is intended to constitute what could be considered to be a reasonable regional balance.

127. As a Latin-American I am especially pleased with the admission of Argentina, to which Brazil is connected by historical and intimate friendship. I am quite convinced that Argentina, together with the five other members proposed, will contribute substantially to the performance of the tasks entrusted to the Committee.

128. I wish, however, to reserve the position of my delegation on a point of principle. Consistently with the view held in previous circumstances, my delegation is of the opinion that it would be politically sounder and juridically more advisable to adopt the same course of action which was followed when the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was created: that is, to seek for its enlargement also the endorsement of the General Assembly

129. Mr. CARACCIOLO (Italy) (translation from French): My delegation would like to congratulate the co-Chairmen on the agreement which they have reached -- in keeping with the wish I expressed in my statement the day before yesterday (ENDC/PV.423, paras.27, 28) -- on the question of the enlargement of our Committee. In their statement the co-Chairmen inform us that their choice has not been easy. It follows from this statement that a perfect balance, both geographic and political, was not easy to achieve. But we take note of the fact that, in deference to the wish expressed by several delegations, the two co-Chairmen have laid their proposal before our Committee. Indeed, it seems to me that participation by the Conference in this choice is necessary also for the purpose of facilitating as wide approval as possible by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

130. Mr. HUSAIN (India): It will be recalled that, when the first instalment of the expansion of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was placed before the Committee on 23 May by the co-Chairmen, my delegation, while warmly welcoming at that time the inclusion of Japan and Mongolia, expressed, together with most members of the Committee, serious concern at the procedure adopted and the manner in which the co-Chairmen had taken a decision about enlargement without proper, purposeful and meaningful consultations with all the members of the Committee uniformly and without discrimination.

131. My delegation also expressed the hope that the further enlargement would be made in accordance with the statement of the co-Chairmen circulated to the members of the Committee. That statement envisaged consultations with the members of the Committee, and also the preservation and maintenance of the geographical and political balance on the basis of which the Committee was established in 1961. My delegation further expressed the hope that in considering further enlargement the co-Chairmen would ensure that the Committee would remain a small and effective negotiating body.

132. The Indian delegation has carefully studied the announcement of the co-Chairmen of 30 July in connexion with the further enlargement of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, read out today by you, Madam Chairman, in this formal meeting and placed before us for our information. It is our considered view that this is not consistent with the statement of the co-Chairmen of 23 May and the assurances given at the informal meeting of the Committee on that date. Prior to the announcement of the further enlargement, the co-Chairmen had not entered into what could be called proper, purposeful and meaningful consultations with all the members of the Committee.

(Mr. Husain, India)

133. The Indian delegation is also of the view that the enlargement decided upon by the co-Chairmen between themselves has failed to maintain the geographical and political balance as established in 1961, which, it has always been recognized, was necessary for the smooth and effective functioning of this body.

134. As regards the countries now proposed for inclusion in the Committee -- Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia -- we have great pleasure in welcoming them. India has cordial and friendly relations with all of them, and they have our highest respect and regard. Furthermore, with the addition of Yugoslavia, Morocco and Argentina to the non-aligned group we feel confident that that group will be able to make an even more valuable contribution to the work of this Committee. Only recently the capital of Yugoslavia was the venue of the very successful consultative conference of non-aligned States which, among other things, earnestly considered problems relating to disarmament.

135. Mr. ECOBESCO (Romania) (translation from French): The co-Chairmen submitted to us yesterday their recommendation concerning the admission to the Committee of the following States: Hungary, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Argentina, Morocco and Pakistan. We consider this proposal in the light of our position of principle in the matter. We have always believed that, given the importance to the whole world of the problems which are the subject of our negotiations, it would be useful and necessary to ensure the participation in the Committee's work of other countries which are interested and which manifest the desire to contribute to the consideration and solution of the complex problems of disarmament. Thus, and thanks to the co-operation of the two co-Chairmen, it has been possible to find for the enlargement of the Committee an over-all solution securing the representation of additional States in our negotiations while maintaining the principle on which this body is based.

136. In declaring our satisfaction at this positive development, we should like to express not only our agreement with this proposal but also our desire to see the representatives of those countries take their places among us as soon as possible. The Romanian delegation would like to express the conviction that the new members will make a positive contribution to the progress of the negotiations on disarmament.

137. Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): On behalf of the Bulgarian delegation I should like to express the heartiest congratulations to our co-Chairmen on the agreement to which the laborious negotiations on the enlargement of our Committee have led. Thus a solution has been found to one of the most delicate problems which for several months have aroused the interest of the countries represented on the Committee and of those which follow its work with an attention which we consider to be one of the most encouraging and stimulating factors for the accomplishment of our task.

138. Therefore my delegation welcomes with the greatest satisfaction the decision which has been announced to the effect that Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia will be invited to become members of the Committee. We are well aware of the active interest which those countries have always shown in disarmament problems. We are sure that the active part which they will take in searching for solutions to those problems will make a most valuable contribution to the common efforts. My delegation looks forward with the most cordial sympathy to seeing the representatives of the new member States, who will soon be taking their places at the Conference table, so that we may establish with them those relations of sincere collaboration which are a pledge of the success of our work.

139. Mr. SIRRY (United Arab Republic): I should like to express my delegation's satisfaction at the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have finally reached agreement regarding the additional enlargement of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. This agreement comes as a response to the widely-expressed desire to see the membership of the Committee expanded. Our position on all aspects of this question, and in particular the procedural one, was made clear in our statement on 22 July (ENDC/PV.421, paras. 89, 90). I should like to say now that the countries which it is proposed should participate in the work of our Committee meet with the approval of the United Arab Republic. We welcome them to our midst and are confident that the Committee, when it is enlarged, will prove to be, as in the past, an effective negotiating body devoted to the task of putting an end to the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament.

140. Mr. CZARKOWSKI (Poland): The Polish delegation wishes to congratulate the co-Chairmen on reaching agreement on the expansion of this Committee by six new members. We are satisfied with this expansion, especially as it includes the Government of Hungary, a country with which we have very good relations.

(Mr. Czarkowski, Poland)

141. I wish to make two additional comments. First, I should like to say that in our opinion the number of members of this Committee should be established in a manner which would not diminish its negotiating capacity. Finally, I would express our conviction that the present enlargement will contribute to the establishment of better links with countries in all regions of the world, not only by the new countries by whose addition the Committee is now being expanded, but also by its present members.

142. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): If nobody else wishes to speak at this time, I should like to make a brief statement on behalf of the Swedish delegation.

143. The issue before us does not call for any comment from the Swedish Government, since it is before us not as a matter for consultation but as a matter of information about a decision already taken, a decision on which we cannot have any influence. But, as I have already stated in the informal meeting on 23 May, we think it is a pity that in this context no attention seems to have been paid to the question of France's representation. An earnest appeal and cordial invitation to France now to take its seat and join in our work could have been made, I am certain, on behalf of all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

144. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): We have listened with attention to the statements that have just been made by a number of representatives. Before this meeting is ended I should like to suggest, on behalf of my co-Chairman and myself, a very brief recess of five, or at the most ten, minutes. This would give the co-Chairmen an opportunity to consult together regarding the statements which have just been made to the Committee.

145. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): Members of the Committee have heard the proposal made by the United States representative for a brief recess. Are there any comments on that proposal? If not, I take it that we may proceed accordingly.

The meeting was suspended at 1.20 p.m. and resumed at 1.30 p.m.

146. The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I have been asked by the co-Chairmen to read a statement on their behalf:

"The co-Chairmen have appreciated the opportunity to consult with members of the Committee regarding the complex problem of enlargment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The co-Chairmen recognize that, in expressing their views, members of the Committee have been motivated by the constructive desire to serve the best interests of this Committee.

"After consultations with the members of the Committee, the co-Chairmen have decided to send invitations to Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia to participate in the current session of the Committee.

"As the co-Chairmen have already indicated, they have in mind that the report of the Committee to the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly would, of course, reflect the above developments and thus the action taken to enlarge the Committee would be conveyed to the Assembly."

Are there any comments on that statement? I hear none.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 424th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Mrs. Alva Myrdal, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Japan, Romania, Mongolia, the Chairman, Mexico, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Italy, India, Bulgaria, the United Arab Republic, Poland, Sweden and the United States of America.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 5 August 1969, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.